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Abstract
Some quantum cryptographic protocols can be implemented with specially prepared
chocolate balls, others protected by value indefiniteness cannot. Similarities and differ-
ences of cryptography with quanta and chocolate are discussed. Motivated by these con-
siderations it is proposed to certify quantum random number generators and quantum cryp-
tographic protocols by value indefiniteness. This feature, which derives itself from Bell-
and Kochen-Specker type arguments, is only present in systems with three or more mutu-
ally exclusive outcomes.
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I. QUANTUM RESOURCES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY
Quantum cryptography1 uses quantum resources to encode plain symbols forming some mes-
sage. Thereby, the security of the code against cryptanalytic attacks to recover that message rests
upon the validity of physics, giving new and direct meaning to Landauer’s dictum [6] “information
is physical.”
What exactly are those quantum resources on which quantum cryptography is based upon?
Consider, for a start, the following qualities of quantized systems:
(i) randomness of certain individual events, such as the occurrence of certain measurement
outcomes for states which are in a superposition of eigenstates associated with eigenvalues
corresponding to these outcomes;
(ii) complementarity, as proposed by Pauli, Heisenberg and Bohr;
(iii) value indefiniteness, as attested by Bell, Kochen & Specker and others (often, this property
is referred to as “contextuality”);
(iv) interference and quantum parallelism, allowing the co-representation of classically contra-
dicting states of information by a coherent superposition thereof;
(v) entanglement of two or more particles, as pointed out by Schro¨dinger, such that their state
cannot be represented as the product of states of the isolated, individual quanta, but is rather
defined by the joint or relative properties of the quanta involved.
The first quantum cryptographic protocols, such as the ones by Wiesner [7] and Bennett &
Brassard [8, 9], just require complementarity and random individual outcomes. This might be
perceived ambivalently as and advantage — by being based upon only these two features — yet
also as a disadvantage, since they are not “protected” by Bell- or Kochen-Specker type value
indefiniteness.
This article addresses two issues: a critical re-evaluation of quantum cryptographic protocols
in view of quantum value indefiniteness; as well as suggestions to improve them to assure the best
1 In view of the many superb presentations of quantum cryptography — to name but a few, see Refs. [1, 2] and
[3, Chapter 6] (or, alternatively, [4, Section 6.2]), as well as [5, Section 12.6]; apologies to other authors for this
incomplete, subjective collection — we refrain from any extensive introduction.
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possible protection “our” [10, p. 866] present quantum theory can afford. In doing so, a toy model
will be introduced which implements complementarity but still is value definite. Then it will be
exemplified how to do perform “quasi-classical” quantum-like cryptography with these models.
Finally, methods will be discussed which go beyond the quasi-classical realm.
Even nowadays it is seldom acknowledged that, when it comes to value definiteness, there defi-
nitely is a difference between two- and three-dimensional Hilbert space. This difference can prob-
ably be best explained in terms of (conjugate) bases: whereas different basis in two-dimensional
Hilbert space are disjoint and separated (they merely share the trivial origin), from three dimen-
sions onwards, they may share common elements. It is this inter-connectedness of bases and
“frames” which supports both Gleason’s and the Kochen-Specker theorem. This can, for instance,
be used in derivations of the latter one in three dimensions, which effectively amount to a suc-
cession of rotations of bases along one of their elements (the original Kochen-Specker [11] proof
uses 117 interlinked bases), thereby creating new rotated bases, until the original base is reached.
Note that certain (even dense [12]) “dilutions” of bases break up the possibility to interconnect,
thus allowing value definiteness.
The importance of these arguments for physics is this: since in quantum mechanics the dimen-
sion of Hilbert space is determined by the number of mutually exclusive outcomes, a necessary
condition for a quantum system to be protected by value indefiniteness thus is that the associated
quantum system has at least three mutually exclusive outcomes; two outcomes are insufficient for
this purpose. Of course, one could argue that systems with two outcomes are still protected by
complementarity.
II. REALIZATIONS OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
Let us, for the sake of demonstration, discuss a concrete “toy” system which features com-
plementarity but (not) value (in)definiteness. It is based on the partitions of a set. Suppose the
set is given by S = {1,2,3,4}, and consider two of its equipartitions A = {{1,2},{3,4}} and
B = {{1,3},{2,4}}, as well as the usual set theoretic operations (intersection, union and comple-
ment) and the subset relation among the elements of these two partitions. Then A and B generate
two Boolean algebras LA = { /0,{1,2},{3,4},S} and LB = { /0,{1,3},{2,4},S} which are equiva-
lent to 22; with two atoms a1 = {1,2} & a2 = {3,4}, as well as b1 = {1,3} & b2 = {2,4} per alge-
bra, respectively. Then, the partition logic LA⊕LB = LA,B = 〈{LA,LB},∩,∪,′ ,⊂〉 is obtained as a
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FIG. 1 (a) Greechie diagram of LA,B, consisting of two separate Boolean subalgebras LA and LB; (b) two-
dimensional configuration of spin-12 state measurements along two noncollinear directions. As there are
only two mutually exclusive outcomes, the dimension of the Hilbert space is two.
pasting construction from LA and LB: only elements contribute which are in LA, or in LB, or in both
LA∩LB of them (the atoms of this algebra being the elements a1, . . . ,b2), and all common elements
— in this case only the smallest and greatest elements /0 and S — are identified. LA,B “inherits” the
operations and relations of its subalgebras (also called blocks or contexts) LA and LB. This past-
ing construction yields a nondistributive and thus nonboolean, orthocomplemented propositional
structure. Nondistributivity can quite easily be proven, as a1 ∧ (b1 ∨ b2) 6= (a1 ∧ b1)∨ (a1 ∧ b2),
since b1∨b2 = S, whereas a1∧b1 = a1∧b2 = /0. Note that, although a1, . . . ,b2 are compositions of
elements of S, not all elements of the power set 2S ≡ 24 of S, such as {1} or {1,2,3}, are contained
in LA,B.
Figure 1(a) depicts a Greechie (orthogonality) diagram of LA,B, which represents elements in
a Boolean algebra as single smooth curves; in this case there are just two atoms (least elements
above /0) per subalgebra; and both subalgebras are not interconnected.
Several realizations of this partition logic exist; among them
(i) the propositional structure [13, 14] of spin state measurements of a spin-12 particle along two
noncollinear directions, or of the linear polarization of a photon along two nonorthogonal,
noncollinear directions. A two-dimensional Hilbert space representation of this configura-
tion is depicted in Figure 1(b). Thereby, the choice of the measurement direction decides
which one of the two complementary spin state observables is measured;
(ii) generalized urn models [15, 16]; in particular ones with black balls painted with two sym-
bols having two possible values (say, “0 and “1) in two colors (say, “red” and “green”),
resulting in four types of balls — more explicitly, carrying all variation of the symbols 00 ,
01 , 10 , as well as 11 — many copies of which are randomly distributed in an urn. Sup-
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pose the experimenter looks at them with one of two differently colored eyeglasses, each
one ideally matching the colors of only one of the symbols, such that only light in this wave
length passes through. Thereby, the choice of the color decides which one of the two com-
plementary observables associated with “red” and “green” is measured. Propositions refers
to the possible ball types drawn from the urn, given the information printed in the chosen
color.
(iii) initial state identification problem for deterministic finite (Moore or Mealy) automata in
an unknown initial state [17, 18]; in particular ones 〈S, I,O,δ,λ〉 with four internal states
S = {1,2,3,4}, two input and two output states I = O = {0,1}, an “irreversible” (all-to-
one) transition function δ(s, i) = 1 for all s ∈ S, i ∈ I, and an output function “modelling”
the state partitions by λ(1,0) = λ(2,0) = 0, λ(3,0) = λ(4,0) = 1, λ(1,1) = λ(3,1) = 0,
λ(2,1) = λ(4,1) = 1. Thereby, the choice of the input symbol decides which one of the two
complementary observables is measured.
Let us, for the moment, consider generalized urn models, because they allow a “pleasant”
representation as chocolate balls coated in black foils and painted with color symbols. With the
four types of chocolate balls 00 , 01 , 10 , and 11 drawn from an urn it is possible to execute
the 1984 Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol [8, 9] and “generate” a secret key shared by two
parties [19]. Formally, this reflects (i) the random draw of balls from an urn, as well as (ii) the
complementarity modeled via the color painting and the colored eyeglasses. It also reflects the
possibility to embed this model into a bigger Boolean (and thus classical) algebra 24 by “taking
off the eyeglasses” and looking at both symbols of those four balls types simultaneously. The
atoms of this Boolean algebra are just the ball types, associated with the four cases 00 , 01 , 10 ,
and 11 . The possibility of a classical embedding is also reflected in a “sufficient” number (i.e.,
by a separating, full set) of two-valued, dispersionless states P(a1)+P(a2) = P(b1)+P(b2) = 1,
with P(x) ∈ {0,1}. These two-valued states can also be interpreted as logical truth assignments,
irrespective of whether or not the observables have been (co-)measured.
The possibility to ascribe certain “ontic states” interpretable as observer-independent “omni-
scient elements of physical reality” (in the sense of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [20, p. 777],
a paper which amazingly contains not a single reference) even for complementarity observables
may raise some skepticism or even outright rejection, since that is not how quantum mechanics
is known to perform “at its most mind-boggling mode.” Indeed, so far, the rant presented merely
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attempted to convince the reader that one can have complementarity as well as value definite-
ness; i.e., complementarity is not sufficient for value indefiniteness in the sense of the Bell- and
Kochen-Specker argument.
Unfortunately, the two-dimensionality of the associated Hilbert space is also a feature plaguing
present random number generators based on beam splitters [21–24]. In this respect, most of the
present random number generators using beam splitters are protected only by the randomness
of single outcomes as well as by complementarity, but are not by certified value indefiniteness,
as guaranteed by quantum theory in its standard form [25]. Their methodology should also be
improved by the methods discussed below.
III. SUPPORTING CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH VALUE INDEFINITENESS
Alas, quantum mechanics is more resourceful and mind-boggling than that, as it does not permit
any two-valued states which may be ontologically interpretable as elements of physical reality. So
we have to go further, reminding ourselves that value indefiniteness comes about only for Hilbert
spaces of dimensions three and higher. There are several ways of doing this. The following options
will be discussed:
(i) the known protocols can be generalized to three or more outcomes;
(ii) entangled pairs of particles [26] associated with statistical value indefiniteness may be con-
sidered;
(iii) full, nonprobabilistic value indefiniteness may be attempted, alt least counterfactually.
A. Generalizations to three and more outcomes
In constructing quantum random number generators via beam splitters which ultimately are
used in cryptographic setups, it is important (i) to have full control of the particle source, and (ii)
to use beam splitters with three or more output ports, associated with three- or higher-dimensional
Hilbert spaces. Thereby, it is not sufficient to compose a multiport beam splitter by a succession
of phase shifters and beam splitters with two output ports [27, 28], based on elementary decom-
positions of the unitary group [29].
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Dichotomic sequences could be obtained from sequences containing more than two symbols
by discarding all other symbols from that sequence [30], or by identifying the additional symbols
with one (or both) of the two symbols. For standard normalization procedures and their issues, the
reader is referred to Refs. [31–35].
One concrete realization would be a spin-32 particle. Suppose it is prepared in one of its four
spin states, say the one associated with angular momentum +32 h¯ in some arbitrary but definite
direction; e.g., by a Stern-Gerlach device. Then, its spin state is again measured along a perpen-
dicular direction; e.g., by another, differently oriented, Stern-Gerlach device. Two of the output
ports, say the ones corresponding to positive angular momentum +32 h¯ and +
1
2 h¯, are identified
with the symbol “0,” the other two ports with the symbol “1.” In that way, a random sequence is
obtained from quantum coin tosses which can be ensured to operate under the conditions of value
indefiniteness in the sense of the Kochen-Specker theorem. Of course, this protocol can also be
used to generate random sequences containing four symbols (one symbol per detector).
With respect to the use of beam splitters, the reader is kindly reminded of another issue related
to the fact that beam splitters are reversible devices capable of only translating an incoming signal
into an outgoing signal in a one-to-one manner. The “nondestructive” action of a beam splitter
could also be demonstrated by “reconstructing” the original signal through a “reversed” identical
beam splitter in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer [36]. In this sense, the signal leaving the output
ports of a beam splitter is “as good” for cryptographic purposes as the one entering the device. This
fact relegates considerations of the quality of quantum randomness to the quality of the source.
Every care should thus be taken in preparing the source to assure that the state entering the input
port (i) either is pure and could subsequently be used for measurements corresponding to conjugate
bases, (ii) or is maximally mixed, resulting in a representation of its state in finite dimensions
proportional to the unit matrix.
B. Configurations with statistical value indefiniteness
Protocols like the Ekert protocol [26] utilize two entangled two-state particles for a generation
of a random key shared by two parties. The particular Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen configuration [20]
and the singlet Bell state communicated among the parties guarantee stronger-than-classical cor-
relations of their sequences, resulting in a violation of Bell-type inequalities obeyed by classical
probabilities.
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Although criticized [37] on the grounds that the Ekert protocol in certain cryptanalytic aspects
is equivalent to existing ones (see Ref. [38] for a reconciliation), it offers additional security in
the light of quantum value indefiniteness, as it suggests to probe the nonclassical parts of quantum
statistics. This can best be understood in terms of the impossibility to generate co-existing tables
of all — even the counterfactually possible — measurement outcomes of the quantum observables
used [39]. This, of course, can only happen for the four-dimensional Hilbert space configuration
proposed by Ekert, and not for effectively two-dimensional ones of previous proposals. As a
result, the Eckert protocol cannot be performed with chocolate balls. Formally, this is due to the
nonexistence of two-valued states in four-dimensional Hilbert space.
Suppose one would nevertheless attempt to “mimic” the Ekert protocol with a classical “sin-
glet” state which uses compositions of two balls of the form 00 — 11 / 01 — 10 / 10 — 01 /
11 — 00 , with strictly different (alternatively strictly identical) particle types. The resulting proba-
bilities and expectations would obey the classical Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt bounds [40]. This
is due to the fact that generalized urn models have quasi-classical probability distributions which
can be represented as convex combinations of the full set of separable two-valued states on their
observables.
C. Nonprobabilistic value indefiniteness
In an attempt to fully utilize quantum value indefiniteness, we propose a generalization of the
BB84 protocol on a propositional structure which does not allow any two-valued state. In princi-
ple, this could be any kind of finite configuration of observables in three- and higher-dimensional
Hilbert space; in particular ones which have been proposed for a proof of the Kochen-Specker
theorem.
For the sake of a concrete example, we shall consider the tightly interlinked collection of
observables in four-dimensional Hilbert space presented by Cabello, Estebaranz and Garcı´a-
Alcaine [41, 42], which is depicted in Figure 2. Instead of two measurement bases of two-
dimensional Hilbert space used in the BB84 protocol, nine such bases of four-dimensional Hilbert
space, corresponding to the nine smooth (unbroken) orthogonal curves in Fig. 2 are used. In what
follows, it is assumed that any kind of random decision has been prepared according to the protocol
for generating random sequences sketched above.
(i) In the first step, “Alice” randomly picks an arbitrary basis from the nine available ones, and
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(0,1,−1,0)
(0,0,1,−1)
(1,0,0,1)
(1,−1,0,0)
(−1,1,1,1)
(1,1,1,1)
(1,1,1,−1)
(1,1,−1,−1)
(1,1,−1,1)(0,1,1,0)
(1,−1,1,−1)(0,0,1,1)
(1,0,1,0)(0,0,0,1)
(1,0,−1,0)(0,1,0,0)
(0,1,0,−1)(1,0,0,0)
FIG. 2 Greechie orthogonality diagram of a “short” proof [41, 42] of the Kochen-Specker theorem in four
dimensions containing 24 propositions in 24 tightly interlinked contexts [43]. The graph cannot be colored
by the two colors red (associated with truth) and green (associated with falsity) such that every context
contains exactly one red and three green point. For the sake of a proof, consider just the six outer lines and
the three outer ellipses. Then in a table containing the points of the contexts as columns and the enumeration
of contexts as rows, every red point occurs in exactly two contexts, and there should be an even number of
red points. On the other hand, there are nine contexts involved; thus by the rules it follows that there should
be an odd number (nine) of red points in this table (exactly one per context).
sends a random state to “Bob.”
(ii) In the second step, Bob independently from Alice, picks another basis at random, and mea-
sures the particle received from Alice.
(iii) In the third step, Alice and Bob compare their bases over a public channel, and keep only
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(1,0,0,0) (0,1,1,0) (0,1,−1,0) (0,0,0,1)
(0,1,0,0)
(1,0,−1,0)
(1,0,1,0)
(0,0,−1,1)
(0,0,1,1)
(1,0,0) (0,1,1) (0,1,−1)
(0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
(a) (b)
FIG. 3 Subdiagrams of Figure 2 allowing (value definite) chocolate ball realizations.
those events which were recorded either in a common basis, or in an observable interlinking
two different bases.
(iv) Both then exchange some of the remaining matching outcomes over a public channel to
assure that nobody has attended their quantum channel.
(v) Bob and Alice encode the four outcomes by four or less different symbols. As a result, Bob
and Alice share a common random key certified by quantum value indefiniteness.
The advantage of this protocol resides in the fact that is does not allow its realization by any
partition of a set, or any kind of colored chocolate balls. Because if it did, any such coloring could
be used to generate “classical” two-valued states, which in turn may be used towards a classical
re-interpretation of the quantum observables; an option ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Readers not totally convinced at this point might, for the sake of demonstration, consider a gen-
eralized urn model with nine colors, associated with the nine bases in Figure 2. Suppose further
that there is a uniform set of symbols, say {0,1,2,3} for all four colors. If all varieties (permu-
tations) contribute, the number of different types of balls should be 49. Note, however, that every
interlinked color must have identical (or at least unique “partner”) symbols in the interlinking
colors; a condition which cannot be satisfied “globally” for all the interlinks in Figure 2.
A simplified version of the protocol, which is based on a subdiagram of Figure 2, contains
only three contexts, which are closely interlinked. The structure of observables is depicted in
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Figure 3(a). The vectors represent observables in four-dimensional Hilbert space in their usual in-
terpretation as projectors generating the one-dimensional subspaces spanned by them. In addition
to this quantum mechanical representation, and in contrast to the Kochen-Specker configuration
in Figure 2, this global collection of observables still allows for value definiteness, as there are
“enough” two valued states permitting the formation of a partition logic and thus a chocolate ball
realization; e.g.,
{{{1,2},{3,4,5,6,7},{8,9,10,11,12},{13,14}},
{{1,4,5,9,10},{2,6,7,11,12},{3,8},{13,14}},
{{1,2},{3,8},{4,6,9,11,13},{5,7,10,12,14}}}.
The three partitions of the set {1,2, . . . ,14} have been obtained by indexing the atoms in terms
of all the nonvanishing two-valued states on them [18, 44], as depicted in Figure 4. They can be
straightforwardly applied for a chocolate ball configuration with three colors (say green, red and
blue) and four symbols (say 0, 1, 2, and 3). The 14 ball types corresponding to the 14 different
two-valued measures are as follows: 000 , 010 , 121 , 102 , 103 , 112 , 113 , 221 , 202 , 203 ,
212 , 213 , 332 , and 333 .
Figure 3(b) contains a three-dimensional subconfiguration with two complementary contexts
interlinked in a single observable. It again has a value definite representation in terms of partitions
of a set, and thus again a chocolate ball realization with three symbols in two colors; e.g., 00 , 11 ,
12 , 21 , and 22 .
IV. NONCOMMUTATIVE CRYPTOGRAPHY WHICH CANNOT BE REALIZED QUANTUM
MECHANICALLY
Quantum mechanics does not allow a “triangular” structure of observables similar to the one
depicted in Fig. 3 with three instead of four atoms per block (context), since no geometric config-
uration of tripods exist in three-dimensional vector space which would satisfy this scheme. (For
a different propositional structure not satisfiable by quantum mechanics, see Specker’s program-
matic article [45] from 1960.) It contains six atoms 1, . . . ,6 in the blocks 1–2–3, 3–4–5, 5–6–1.
In order to obtain a partition logic on which the chocolate ball model can be based, the four two-
valued states are enumerated and depicted in Figure 5.
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151
1
6
2
2
7
3
2
5
8
4
2
59 5
2
68
6
2
6
9 7
3
7
8
3
5
8
9
3
59 10
3
68
11
3
6
9 12
4
8
13
4
9 14
FIG. 4 Two-valued states interpretable as global truth functions of the observables depicted in Figure 3(a).
Encircled numbers count the states, smaller numbers label the observables.
1
4
1
3
6
2
2
5
3
2
6 4
4
FIG. 5 Two-valued states on triangular propositional structure with three atoms per context or block.
The associated partition logic is given by
{{{1},{2},{3,4}},
{{1,4},{2},{3}},
{{1},{2,4},{3}}}.
Every one of the three partitions of the set {1, . . . ,4} of ball types labelled by 1 through 4 corre-
sponds to a color; and there are three symbols per colors. For the first (second/third) partition, the
propositions associated with these protocols are:
• “when seen through light of the first (second/third) color (e.g., pink/light blue/yellow), sym-
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{1} {3,4} {2}
{3}
{1,4}{2,4}
FIG. 6 Propositional structure allowing (value definite) chocolate ball realizations with three atoms per
context or block which does not allow a quantum analog.
bol “0” means ball type number 1 (2/3);”
• “when seen through light of the first (second/third) color (e.g., pink/light blue/yellow), sym-
bol “1” means ball type number 3 or 4 (1 or 4/2 or 4);”
• “when seen through light of the first (second/third) color (e.g., pink/light blue/yellow), sym-
bol “2” means ball type number 2 (3/1).”
More explicitly, there are four ball types of the form 012 , 201 , 120 , and 111 . The resulting
propositional structure is depicted in Fig. 6. With respect to realizability, cryptographic proto-
cols — such as the one sketched above — based on this structure are “stranger than quantum
mechanical” ones.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
It has been argued that value indefiniteness should be used as a quantum resource against crypt-
analytic attacks, as complementarity may not be a sufficient resource for the type of “objective”
security envisaged by quantum cryptography. A necessary condition for this quantum resource is
the presence of at least three mutually exclusive outcomes.
It may be objected that quantum complementarity suffices as resource against cryptanalytic
attacks, and thus the original BB84 protocol needs not be amended. To this criticism I respond
with a performance of the original BB84 protocols with chocolate balls [19]; or more formally, by
stating that configurations with just two outcomes leave open the possibility of a quasi-classical
explanation, as they cannot rule out the existence of sufficiently many two-valued states in order
to construct homeomorphisms, i.e., structure-preserving maps between the quantum and classical
13
observables. Thus, when it comes to fully “harvesting” the quantum, it appears prudent to utilize
value indefiniteness, one of its most “mind-boggling” features encountered if one assumes the
existence of nonoperational yet counterfactual observables.
Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges discussions with Cristian Calude and Josef Tkadlec, as well
as the kind hospitality of the Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science
(CDMTCS) of the Department of Computer Science at The University of Auckland. This work
was also supported by The Department for International Relations of the Vienna University of
Technology. The pink–light blue–yellow coloring scheme is by Renate Bertlmann; communicated
to the author by Reinhold Bertlmann.
References
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptography,” Review of Modern Physics
74, 145–195 (2002).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.74.145
[2] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, “The
Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution,” (2008).
http://arxiv.org/abs/0802.4155
[3] N. D. Mermin, “Lecture Notes on Quantum Computation,” (2002-2008).
http://people.ccmr.cornell.edu/ mermin/qcomp/CS483.html
[4] N. D. Mermin, Quantum Computer Science (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
http://people.ccmr.cornell.edu/ mermin/qcomp/CS483.html
[5] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 2000).
[6] R. Landauer, “Information is Physical,” Physics Today 44, 23–29 (1991).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.881299
[7] S. Wiesner, “Conjugate coding,” SIGACT News 15, 78–88 (1983).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1008908.1008920
[8] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum Cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,”
14
in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing,
Bangalore, India pp. 175–179 (1984).
http://www.research.ibm.com/people/b/bennetc/bennettc198469790513.pdf
[9] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and J. Smolin, “Experimental quantum cryptogra-
phy,” Journal of Cryptology 5, 3–28 (1992).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00191318
[10] M. Born, “Zur Quantenmechanik der Stoßvorga¨nge,” Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik 37, 863–867 (1926).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01397477
[11] S. Kochen and E. P. Specker, “The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics,” Journal
of Mathematics and Mechanics (now Indiana University Mathematics Journal) 17, 59–87 (1967),
reprinted in [46, pp. 235–263].
http://dx.doi.org/10.1512/iumj.1968.17.17004
[12] D. A. Meyer, “Finite precision measurement nullifies the Kochen-Specker theorem,” Physical Review
Letters 83, 3751–3754 (1999).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.83.3751
[13] G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, “The Logic of Quantum Mechanics,” Annals of Mathematics 37,
823–843 (1936).
[14] K. Svozil, Quantum Logic (Springer, Singapore, 1998).
[15] R. Wright, “Generalized urn models,” Foundations of Physics 20, 881–903 (1990).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01889696
[16] A. Dvurecˇenskij, S. Pulmannova´, and K. Svozil, “Partition Logics, Orthoalgebras and Automata,”
Helvetica Physica Acta 68, 407–428 (1995).
[17] E. F. Moore, “Gedanken-Experiments on Sequential Machines,” in Automata Studies, C. E. Shannon
and J. McCarthy, eds. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1956), pp. 129–153.
[18] K. Svozil, “Logical equivalence between generalized urn models and finite automata,” International
Journal of Theoretical Physics 44, 745–754 (2005).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10773-005-7052-0
[19] K. Svozil, “Staging quantum cryptography with chocolate balls,” American Journal of Physics 74,
800–803 (2006).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.2205879
[20] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be
15
considered complete?” Physical Review 47, 777–780 (1935).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777
[21] K. Svozil, “The quantum coin toss—Testing microphysical undecidability,” Physics Letters A 143,
433–437 (1990).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0375-9601(90)90408-G
[22] J. G. Rarity, M. P. C. Owens, and P. R. Tapster, “Quantum Random-number Generation and Key
Sharing,” Journal of Modern Optics 41, 2435–2444 (1994).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09500349414552281
[23] T. Jennewein, U. Achleitner, G. Weihs, H. Weinfurter, and A. Zeilinger, “A Fast and Compact Quan-
tum Random Number Generator,” Review of Scientific Instruments 71, 1675–1680 (2000).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.1150518
[24] A. Stefanov, N. Gisin, O. Guinnard, L. Guinnard, and H. Zbinden, “Optical quantum random number
generator,” Journal of Modern Optics 47, 595–598 (2000).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/095003400147908
[25] J. von Neumann, Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (Springer, Berlin, 1932), English
translation in [47].
[26] A. K. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem,” Physical Review Letters 67, 661–663
(1991).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.67.661
[27] M. Reck, A. Zeilinger, H. J. Bernstein, and P. Bertani, “Experimental realization of any discrete unitary
operator,” Physical Review Letters 73, 58–61 (1994).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.73.58
[28] K. Svozil, “Noncontextuality in multipartite entanglement,” J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 38, 5781–5798
(2005).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/38/25/013
[29] F. D. Murnaghan, The Unitary and Rotation Groups (Spartan Books, Washington, D.C., 1962).
[30] C. Calude and I. Chit¸escu, “Qualitative properties of P. Martin-Lo¨f random sequences,” Unione
Matematica Italiana. Bollettino. B. Serie VII 3, 229–240 (1989).
[31] J. von Neumann, “Various Techniques Used in Connection With Random Digits,” National Bureau of
Standards Applied Math Series 3, 36–38 (1951), reprinted in John von Neumann, Collected Works,
(Vol. V), A. H. Traub, editor, MacMillan, New York, 1963, p. 768.
16
[32] P. Elias, “The Efficient Construction of an Unbiased Random Sequence,” Ann. Math. Statist. 43, 865–
870 (1972).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177692552
[33] Y. Peres, “Iterating Von Neumann’s procedure for extracting random bits,” The Annals of Statistics
20, 590–597 (1992).
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2242181
[34] M. Dichtl, “Bad and Good Ways of Post-processing Biased Physical Random Numbers,” in Fast Soft-
ware Encryption. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 4593/2007, A. Biryukov, ed. (Springer,
Berlin and Heidelberg, 2007), pp. 137–152, 14th International Workshop, FSE 2007, Luxembourg,
Luxembourg, March 26-28, 2007, Revised Selected Papers.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5 9
[35] P. Lacharme, “Post-Processing Functions for a Biased Physical Random Number Generator,” in Fast
Software Encryption. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 5086/2008, K. Nyberg, ed. (Springer,
Berlin and Heidelberg, 2008), pp. 334–342, 15th International Workshop, FSE 2008, Lausanne,
Switzerland, February 10-13, 2008, Revised Selected Papers.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4 21
[36] D. M. Greenberger, M. A. Horne, and A. Zeilinger, “Multiparticle interferometry and the superposition
principle,” Physics Today 46, 22–29 (1993).
[37] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and D. N. Mermin, “Quantum cryptography without Bell’s theorem,”
Physical Review Letters 68, 557–559 (1992).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.68.557
[38] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and A. K. Ekert, “Quantum Cryptography,” Scientific American 267,
50–57 (1992).
[39] A. Peres, “Unperformed experiments have no results,” American Journal of Physics 46, 745–747
(1978).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.11393
[40] J. F. Clauser, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony, and R. A. Holt, “Proposed Experiment to Test Local Hidden-
Variable Theories,” Physical Review Letters 23, 880–884 (1969).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.23.880
[41] A. Cabello, J. M. Estebaranz, and G. Garcı´a-Alcaine, “Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem: A proof with
18 vectors,” Physics Letters A 212, 183–187 (1996).
17
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0375-9601(96)00134-X
[42] A. Cabello, “Experimentally Testable State-Independent Quantum Contextuality,” Physical Review
Letters 101, 210 401 (2008).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.101.210401
[43] J. Tkadlec (2009), private communication.
[44] K. Svozil, “Contexts in quantum, classical and partition logic,” in Handbook of Quantum Logic and
Quantum Structures, K. Engesser, D. M. Gabbay, and D. Lehmann, eds. (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2008),
pp. 551–586.
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0609209
[45] E. Specker, “Die Logik nicht gleichzeitig entscheidbarer Aussagen,” Dialectica 14, 239–246 (1960),
reprinted in [46, pp. 175–182]; English translation: The logic of propositions which are not simulta-
neously decidable, reprinted in [48, pp. 135-140].
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1960.tb00422.x
[46] E. Specker, Selecta (Birkha¨user Verlag, Basel, 1990).
[47] J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1955).
[48] C. A. Hooker, The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quantum Mechanics. Volume I: Historical Evolution
(Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975).
18
